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We construct a dynamic monopolistic competition model with heterogeneous firms to study 
the links between firms’ earnings volatility, the degree of financial constraints that they face, 
their survival probabilities, and their export market participation decisions. Our model 
predicts that more volatile firms are more likely to face financial constraints and to go 
bankrupt, need to be more productive to stay in the market, and are more likely to enter export 
markets. A further implication is that through market diversification, exports tend to stabilize 
firms’ total sales. We test these predictions, using a panel of 9292 UK manufacturing firms 
over the period 1993-2003. The data provide strong support to our model.  
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Non-technical summary 
 
A rise in firm-level income volatility has been documented in the US and Europe in recent years. A 
number of studies have focused on the causes of this rise; fewer on its consequences. We construct a 
dynamic model of monopolistic competition aimed at studying the impact of firms’ income volatility on 
the degree of financial constraints that they face, and on their probabilities of survival, and of entering 
xport markets.   e
 
Our model assumes that each firm has to borrow a certain fixed amount to operate in the market, and 
that it faces a normally distributed income shock, which determines its income volatility. We derive a 
function relating a firm’s productivity and volatility with its access to credit, whereby more productive and 
less volatile firms can obtain cheaper loans. As volatility increases, the cost of obtaining external funds 
grows, since lenders expect lower returns from highly volatile firms in the case of bankruptcy. Keeping 
other firm’s characteristics constant, more volatile firms are more likely to go bankrupt and need to be 
ore productive to stay in the market.   m
 
When the country opens up to trade, the model predicts that exporters can smooth their income. 
Entering export markets leads to two contrasting effects on the degree of financing constraints faced by 
firms. First, if the sunk cost that need to be paid to enter export markets are not too high, exporters 
experience a decrease in their financial constraints because, from the point of view of the bank, they 
have become less risky, due to their reduced volatility. Second, trade simultaneously increases 
competition, which decreases the expected profits of some incumbent firms. As competition rises, the 
probability of bankruptcy increases for some firms, limiting their access to external funds. We show that 
in the first case, trade can generate a reallocation of firms in the market, such that less productive and 
less volatile firms are replaced with highly productive and volatile ones. However, in the second case, 
trade does not necessarily raise average productivity in the market. Our analysis also shows that more 
volatile firms have more incentives to trade than their less volatile counterparts, as they take more 
advantage from the benefit of sales stabilization and associated lower financial costs. Volatility provides 
herefore a link between trade and the financial costs faced by the firms.  t
 
We test the predictions of the model using a panel of 9292 UK manufacturing firms over the period 
1993-2003. We find empirical evidence showing that more volatile firms are more likely to go bankrupt, 
need to be more productive to stay in the market, and are more likely to enter export markets. A further 





1.  Introduction 
A rise in the volatility of firms’ earnings streams has been documented throughout the world in recent 
years
1. According to Comin and Philippon (2005), this may be due to increased competition in product 
markets, which might in turn follow from deregulation, increases in R&D investment, and higher use of 
debt and equity.  
A vast literature has dealt with the adverse effects associated with high firm-level earnings 
volatility. For instance, Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) have shown that high volatility is costly for 
firms, as it implies high costs in transactions with stakeholders. Gibbins et al. (1990), Chaney and 
Lewis (1995), and Fudenberg and Tirole (1995) have insisted on the adverse reputation effects of high 
earnings volatility for firm managers. Other papers have shown that high volatility limits firms’ access 
to external funds, and increases the cost of obtaining credit (Badrinath et al., 1989; Barnes, 2001; 
Minton and Schrand, 1999)
2. Consequently, in order to avoid these adverse effects, managers should try 
to smooth their earnings. One possible way to achieve this goal is by exporting (Hirsch and Lev, 1971; 
Campa and Shaver, 2002). In this way, firms can diversify their incomes, leading to more stable cash 
flow and earnings streams (Buch et al. 2006), and, in turn, to a lower degree of financial constraints 
(Greenaway et al., 2007). To the best of our knowledge, no paper in the literature has analyzed the 
extent to which firm-level earnings volatility affects firms’ survival probabilities and their decisions to 
enter export markets. Our paper bridges this gap. 
We construct a dynamic model of monopolistic competition aimed at studying the impact of firms’ 
income volatility on the degree of financial constraints that they face
3, which in turn affects their 
probabilities of survival, and of entering export markets. Specifically, our model assumes that each firm 
has to borrow a certain fixed amount to operate in the market, and that it faces a normally distributed 
income shock, which determines its income volatility. We derive a function relating a firm’s 
productivity and income volatility with its access to credit, whereby more productive and less volatile 
firms can obtain cheaper loans. As volatility increases, the cost of obtaining external funds grows, since 
lenders expect lower returns from highly volatile firms in case of bankruptcy. Keeping other firm’s 
characteristics constant, more volatile firms are therefore more likely to go bankrupt and need to be 
more productive to stay in the market. 
When the country opens up to trade, our model predicts that exporters can smooth their income. 
Entering export markets leads to two contrasting effects on the degree of financing constraints faced by 
                                                 
1 See Chaney et al. (2002) and Comin and Mulani (2004), who document this trend focusing on US firms; Comin 
and Philippon (2005), who analyze firms in 80 OECD countries; Thesmar and Thoenig (2004), who look at 
French firms; and Angelidis and Tessaromatis (2005), whose study is based on the UK. 
2 Focusing on a different perspective, Comin et al. (2006) show that increased firm-level earnings volatility in the 
US explains about 60 percent of the observed increase in the high frequency volatility of wages. 
3 We will hereafter use the terms income volatility and earnings volatility interchangeably.  
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firms. First, if the sunk cost that needs to be paid to enter export markets is not too high, exporters 
experience a decrease in their financial constraints because, from the point of view of the bank, they 
have become less risky, due to their reduced volatility. Second, trade simultaneously increases 
competition, which decreases the expected profits of some incumbent firms. As competition rises, the 
probability of bankruptcy increases for some companies, limiting their access to external funds. We 
show that in the first case, trade can generate a reallocation of firms in the market, such that less 
productive and less volatile firms are replaced with highly productive and volatile ones. However, in 
the second case, trade does not necessarily raise average productivity in the market. Our analysis also 
shows that more volatile firms generally have more incentives to trade than their less volatile 
counterparts, as they take more advantage from the benefit of sales stabilization and associated lower 
financial costs. Volatility provides therefore a link between trade and the financial costs faced by firms. 
Our model can be seen as an extension of Melitz’s (2003) framework, in which firms’ earnings 
volatility, and, consequently, their ability to obtain external credit are included as new elements of firm 
heterogeneity, in addition to productivity. We test the predictions of the model using a panel of 9292 
UK manufacturing firms over the period 1993-2003. Our choice of the UK in our empirical testing of 
the model stems from the fact that the UK is the fifth largest exporter of manufactures globally, and 
within our sample, almost 70 percent of all firms exported in at least one year. Moreover, on average, 
30 percent of the total sales of UK exporters are directed abroad. We find empirical evidence showing 
that more volatile firms are more likely to go bankrupt, need to be more productive to stay in the 
market, and are more likely to enter export markets. A further result is that through market 
diversification, exports tend to stabilize firms’ total sales. 
  The rest of the paper is laid out as follows. In Section 2, we outline our model, in the closed 
economy case. Section 3 focuses on the open economy case. In Section 4, we summarize the main 
testable implications that can be derived from our model. Section 5 describes our data. Section 6 tests 
the main implications of the model, and Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Closed  economy  model 
2.1 Demand 
We assume that the economy has two sectors: one is characterized by a numeraire good, and the other 
by differentiated products. The preferences of a representative consumer are given by the following 
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where  ˆ r  is the discount factor, x0 is the consumption of the numeraire good, and Y is an index of 









⎣⎦ ∫ , where 01 ρ < < ;  z y  is the quantity of variety z of the differentiated 
product demanded by the consumer; M is the mass of firms in the stationary competitive equilibrium; 
and  ) 1 ( 1 ρ α − =  is the elasticity of substitution among varieties. As shown by Dixit and Stiglitz 
(1977), the consumer’s behavior can be modeled considering the set of varieties of the aggregate good 












⎣ ⎦ ∫ . In this set-up, the aggregate demand for any of 
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We assume that firms are heterogeneous. The first element of heterogeneity among firms is their level 
of productivity, denoted by  ˆ [, ) ϕ ϕ ∈∞ , where  ˆ 0 ϕ >  is the minimum level of productivity in the 
market equilibrium. In monopolistic competitive markets, productivity affects the firms’ variable cost. 
More productive firms have lower marginal costs than their less productive counterparts. Firms’ 
revenues depend on the average productivity in the market  ˆˆ () ϕ ϕϕ > , which is a function of the 
threshold productivity
4. Each of the differentiated goods is produced only with labor. The technology 
used to produce each good is given by:  (,) (,) lI y ϕ ϕϕ ϕ ϕ = + , where l is labor, and I is a fixed cost. 
This leads to the standard pricing rule  () 1 ( ) p ϕ ρϕ = , where the numerator represents the common 
wage rate, normalized to one. Firms with high levels of productivity charge lower prices and obtain 
higher revenues
5. 
We introduce a second and new element of heterogeneity among firms: their idiosyncratic 
income volatility, denoted by  [0, ) σ ∈∞ . Volatility affects firms’ output through an exogenous firm-
specific demand shock which occurs in each period, immediately after they have chosen prices and 
                                                 
4 In the remaining part of the paper, we omit this dependence from our notation, except when needed in 
derivations. 
5 As in Melitz (2003), 
1
1 () Y Mp P
α ϕ
− = . Therefore, 
11 (, )  () yM
α α ϕϕ ρ ϕ ϕ
− − = .  
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quantities. Specifically, in each period, a firm’s income is given by  ()()(,) t zp y σ ϕϕ ϕ , where zt is the 
demand shock, which is distributed normally with mean equal to one and standard deviation σ . Note 
that if  0 σ =  for all firms, the model simplifies to Melitz’s (2003) case. We consider that firms’ 
productivity and income volatility are exogenous, independent, and constant parameters
6.  
 
2.3 The  firm’s  problem 
Each firm faces a cash-in advance constraint: at the beginning of every period it needs to incur a fixed 
cost to enter the market, and requires the bank to finance it
7. Both the bank and the borrower are 
assumed to be risk neutral. As in Cooley and Quadrini (2001), only one period debt contracts are signed 
with the bank. If the firm defaults, the bank liquidates it, and the firm immediately exits the industry. 
The profit of a firm of type (,) ϕ σ , at period t after the realization of its shock zt  can be written as: 
[]
(,)
(,,, ) ()(,) 1 (,,) tt t
y
zz p y r I
ϕ ϕ
ϕϕσ ϕ ϕϕ ϕϕσ
ϕ
Π= − − +        (2) 
We assume that the bank perfectly observes the firm’s characteristics. It makes a take-it-or-
leave-it offer to the firm at the beginning of every period
8, and issues funds at an interest rate r, that 
differs among firms. As in Cooley and Quadrini (2001), we assume that the bank chooses the interest 
rate in such a way that the expected repayment from the loan is equal to the repayment of a riskless 
loan. This is summarized in the following equation:  
0 ( 1 ) [ 1 (,,) ]  I  [ 1 (,,,) ] ()(,,,) rI r r C r ϕ ϕσ δϕϕσ σδϕϕσ += + − + , 
where  0 (1 ) ( ). rI C σ + >   (3) 
The left-hand side of Equation (3) gives the return of the loan at the riskless interest rate  0 r . 
The right hand side says that with probability (1 δ − ), the firm can repay its debts, and with probability 
δ , it goes bankrupt. In case of bankruptcy, the bank gets a collateral denoted by  () C σ . The bank does 
not observe the future value of the collateral. However, since the firm’s earnings can be used as 
collateral, ex-ante, the bank considers the firm’s collateral to be negatively dependent on its income 
                                                 
6 In other papers, productivity and volatility are treated as endogenous variables. For instance, in Comin and 
Mulani (2005), firms choose how much to invest in R&D. Since R&D investments are risky, they can affect both 
productivity and its volatility. In contrast, we analyze income volatility, and not the volatility of productivity. 
Moreover, in our model, income volatility is a demand variable that the firm cannot control in the short/medium-
run, while productivity is a cost variable, which, in order to simplify the model, is considered as exogenous. 
7 In order to simplify the model, we consider that the level of debt is the same for all firms, and that firms do not 
choose their optimal amount of debt. 
8 See Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006) for a similar approach. We consider that both the bank and the firm commit 





volatility. For this reason, we assume that the expected value of the collateral depends negatively on the 
firm’s income volatility
9. 
The firm’s probability of bankruptcy is given by the following normal cumulative distribution: 
2
2
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The probability of bankruptcy in Equation (4) involves a threshold shock, denoted by 
(,,) zr ϕ ϕ <1. A firm will exit the market as soon as it experiences an income shock below the 
threshold. The threshold shock is the value of the shock for which the firm gets zero profits, and it 
solves the following Equation:  
(,)
()(,) ( 1 ) 0
y




−− + = .          (5) 
The next proposition, proved in Appendix 1A, gives the relationship between a firm’s volatility 
and its probability of bankruptcy.  
 
Proposition 1: Consider two firms that only differ in their earnings volatility. The firm with higher 
volatility has a higher probability of bankruptcy than the firm with lower volatility. It is consequently 
more costly for the more volatile firm to obtain external finance.  
 
  This prediction is in line with the literature that argues that earnings management can be 
motivated by a desire to decrease earnings volatility. For example, Badrinath et al. (1989) indicate that 
investors prefer firms with smooth incomes because firms with high volatility are perceived as more 
risky. It is also consistent with the empirical result of Minton and Schrand (1999), who show that high 
cash flow volatility is positively related with the costs of accessing external funds. Our finding also 
                                                                                                                                                          
 
9 A firm is assumed to default and go bankrupt if it is unable to completely repay its loan: a renegotiation of the 
loan is not allowed. Furthermore, as we will show in Proposition 1, more volatile firms are more likely to go 
bankrupt than their less volatile counterparts. This can be justified considering that firms with higher income 
volatility are likely to suffer from more extreme shocks, which lead to more extreme incomes. In case of default, 
they are therefore more likely not to achieve the minimum income needed to repay the loan. In contrast, the 
shocks of less volatile companies are more concentrated around the mean. For this reason, in case of bankruptcy, a 
more volatile firm is expected to pay back a lower collateral than a less volatile company (see Rajan and Winton, 
1995, for a model with variable collateral). As we will see later, this is a necessary condition to obtain a function 
that relates firms’ productivity and volatility, and to separate those firms that can obtain a loan from those that 
cannot in terms of firm’s volatility. Later in the paper, we will analyze two additional cases: the case in which 
there is no collateral, and the case in which collateral is independent on the firm’s volatility. Several articles have 
analyzed the effect of collateral uncertainty on firms’ default probabilities (see for example Jokivuolle and Peura, 




provides some theoretical foundation to the empirical results of Barnes (2001), who find a negative 
relationship between the volatility of a firm’s earnings and its market valuation.  
In every period new firms enter the market. Market characteristics therefore change over time. 
We assume that within each period the timing of actions is as follows (see Figure 1). First, incumbent 
firms, new firms, and banks observe the average productivity and average volatility in the market. 
Given the average productivity and volatility, firms decide how much to produce. Each firm can 
perfectly determine the interest rate that it has to pay during this period. It will opt to stay in the market, 
to ask for a loan, and to produce, if its expected future value is positive. Firms with productivity and 
volatility levels such that their expected future value is negative exit the market. Firms that choose to 
stay in the market ask for a loan and produce. When the income shock is realized, firms with negative 
profits go bankrupt and exit the market, while firms with positive profits repay the loan to the bank and 
continue to the following period.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 
 
2.4  Existence of equilibrium interest rate and exit function 
Before the realization of the shock, firms and banks observe market characteristics. The value of a firm 
of type (,) ϕ σ  at period t before the realization of the shock is given by: 
(,,, 1 )













=− Π = ∑ .     (6) 
Firms with positive future value, i.e. such that their average expected profits are positive 
( (,,, 1 ) 0 ϕ ϕσ Π> ), decide to ask for a loan
10. In the absence of bankruptcy, these firms’ average 
expected profit is given by the following expression: 
(,)
(,,) ()(,) [ 1 (,,) ] (,)[ 1 (,,) ]
y
p yr I d r I
ϕ ϕ
ϕϕσ ϕ ϕϕ ϕσϕ ϕϕ ϕσϕ
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 represents the firm’s income net of its variable costs. The equilibrium interest 
rate is  0 [,] rr r ∈ % . The maximum interest rate that the firm is willing to pay is the interest rate which 
leads to an expected future value equal to zero. We denote this interest rate by r %. It satisfies: 
1( , ) rd I ϕ ϕ += % . When the firm is charged the interest rate r %, the threshold shock is  () 1 zr = % , and 
the probability of bankruptcy is  () 1 / 2 r δ = % , independent on the firm’s volatility. The minimum  
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interest rate that the bank charges is the riskless interest rate  0. r  We show that there exists a unique 
0 *[, ] rr r ∈ %  such that Equations (3), (4), and (5) hold, i.e. such that: 
0 ( * ) ( *, , , )[(1 *) ( )] 0 Ir r r r I C δ ϕσϕ σ −− + − =        (7) 
Let us to define  10 () ( ) , j rI r r =− and  2( , , , ) ( , , , )[(1 ) ( )] jr r r I C ϕ σϕ δ ϕσϕ σ = +− . We 
show in Appendix 1B that, when  0 (,) () 2( 1 ) dC I r ϕ ϕσ + ≥+ , these functions intersect at a unique 
point, as can be seen in Figure 2.  
Two possible cases need to be highlighted. On the one hand, if the collateral is 
0 () ( 1 ) Cr I σ ≥+ , there is no risk, and the bank will set  0 * rr = . This case is not relevant for our 
analysis. On the other hand if  0 () ( 1 ) Cr I σ <+ , the following three possibilities arise. First, for firms 
with  0 (,) () 2( 1 ) dC I r ϕ ϕσ +> + , the bank charges an interest rate  0 *(, ) rr r ∈ % . Second, for firms with 
0 (,) () 2( 1 ) dC I r ϕ ϕσ +< + , the bank only has incentives to give a loan at an interest rate rr > % . 
Firms know that this interest rate leads to a negative expected future value, and therefore do not obtain 
credit. Finally, for firms with: 
0 (,) () 2( 1 ) dC I r ϕ ϕσ += + ,           ( 8 )  
the bank sets  * rr = % . These firms can get credit and stay in the market in period t with expected zero 
profit. Assuming that the function  () C σ  is invertible, this implies that there exits a function 
(,) s ϕ ϕσ =  that solves Equation (8). Firms whose volatility and productivity lie on this function are 
charged the interest rate r %, leading to zero expected future value. In the model, keeping the 
productivity constant, as volatility increases, the interest rate also increases, and profit decreases (see 
Figure 3). The exit function gives the maximum level of volatility such that, in a market with average 
productivity ϕ , a firm with productivity ϕ  can obtain external finance and stay in the market. 
 
INSERT FIGURES 2 AND 3 
 
The main results of this Section can be summarized as follows: 
 
Exit function and zero profit condition: For  0 ϕ > , there exits a function s  satisfying  (,) s ϕ ϕσ = , 
such that  (,(,) ) 0 . s ϕ ϕϕ Π=  Thus, if  (,) s σ ϕϕ > , the firm cannot obtain a loan and exits the market, 
                                                                                                                                                          
10 In order to simplify the notation, from now on, we will write  (,, ) ϕ ϕσ Π  instead of  (,,, 1 ) ϕ ϕσ Π , and we will 
refer to this expression as average expected profit or expected profit indistinctly.   
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while if  (,) s σ ϕϕ < , the firm obtains credit and remains in the market. This leads to the following 
Proposition: 
 
Proposition 2: Firms characterized by high income volatility need to have a high level of productivity 
to stay in the market. However, there is no correlation between volatility and productivity for low levels 
of volatility: firms with low volatility can have either a high or a low productivity level (as long as their 
productivity is higher than the minimum threshold) and stay in the market. 
 
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is that volatility is costly. Only firms with high productivity levels 
can counterbalance the cost associated with high volatility and obtain credit.  
Let us now give a functional form to the expected value of the collateral. In order to keep the 
model as tractable and as simple as possible, we assume that  0 () CC σ σ = − , where  0 C  is a constant. 














=− + + ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
.        (9) 
Graphically, the exit function can be depicted as in Figure 4. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 4  
 
In the model, we consider that, in case of bankruptcy, the expected value of collateral is a 
negative function of volatility. If either collateral is independent on firms’ volatility or there is no 
collateral, then the probability of bankruptcy is the only term that depends on volatility in Equation (7). 
As we have seen, for any given level of productivity, the exit function is equivalent to finding the level 
of volatility such that rr = %  (i.e. such that the firm’s expected future value is zero). When rr = % , the 
threshold shock is equal to one, and the probability of bankruptcy is  () 1 / 2 r δ = % , independent on the 
firm’s level of volatility. If collateral is independent on volatility, as volatility increases, firms with 
0 (,) 2( 1 ) dI r C ϕ ϕ >+ −  have to pay a higher interest rate, but this interest rate is always lower than 
r %. Firms with  0 (,) 2( 1 ) dI r C ϕ ϕ = +−  obtain on average zero profits. This implies that the exit 
function is independent on volatility. There is therefore an extreme separation in the market between 
companies that get a loan (with productivity such that  0 (,) 2( 1 ) dI r C ϕ ϕ ≥+ − ), and companies that 
do not obtain a loan (with productivity such that  0 (,) 2( 1 ) dI r C ϕ ϕ < +− ), independent on their  
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volatility. This case, is similar to the one in which there is no collateral, whereby the bank finances a 
company if on average the expected return of the investment  (,) / dI ϕ ϕ  is greater than  0 2( 1 ) I r + . 
Figure 4 shows that firms that stay in the market have productivity and volatility below or on 
the function  (,) s ϕ ϕ . In equilibrium, the interest rate charged to each firm depends negatively on the 
firm’s productivity, and positively on both the firm’s volatility and the average productivity in the 
market. The exit function provides a link between average productivity in the market and firms’ 
financial constraints. As average productivity increases, the exit function shifts downward, and the 
earnings of a given firm decrease. The bank realizes that the probability of bankruptcy of this firm 
increases because its earnings are lower, and the interest rate increases up to the point that some firms 
cannot get credit anymore.  
In order to completely characterize the firm’s problem, our next step is to calculate the exit 
function in terms of the minimum level of productivity in the market. The minimum level of 
productivity in the market, denoted by  ˆ ϕ , corresponds to the productivity of a firm with zero volatility, 
whose productivity belongs to the exit function. This implies that  ˆ ϕ  solves  ˆ (,) 0 s ϕ ϕ = . Equating 
Equation (9) to zero, and solving for  ˆ ϕ , we obtain a relationship between minimum and average 
productivity, i.e.  []
1
1
00 ˆ (2 (1 ) ) Ir C M α ϕϕ α− =+ − . Solving for ϕ  we find the opposite relationship: 







(2 (1 ) )
a
IrC M α α −
=>
+−
.      (10) 
Substituting Equation (10) into Equation (9) we get the value of the exit function in terms of the 
minimum productivity level in equilibrium in the market: 
[]
1
00 ˆ (, ) 1 2( 1 )
ˆ
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2.5  Firm entry  
An unbounded pool of identical prospective entrants draw their initial productivity  () g ϕ , and volatility 
() h σ  from common distributions with continuous cumulative distributions given respectively by 
() G ϕ  and  () H σ .  
To enter the market, firms must pay an entry cost denoted by  e f . Firms enter the market if their 
expected ex-ante value equals the entry cost (free entry condition):  
[] 0 .
a





tt E v  represent the expected ex-ante firm value. Then,  [] ( 1 )
as t in








= −Π = Π ∑ , 
where  in P  is the ex-ante probability of successful entry, δ  is the average probability of bankruptcy, 
and  Π  is the average ex-ante profit. The average probability of bankruptcy is given by 
(, )
z
f zd z δσ
−∞
= ∫ , where the average threshold shock is 
1




=+ + , and r  is the average 
interest rate. The threshold shock depends positively on the average volatility in the market and 
negatively on the average productivity. The ex-ante probability of successful entry is equal to: 
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== ∫∫ ∫ . 
We assume that average volatility and average productivity are weighted harmonic means. Therefore, 
the average volatility is given by:  
[]
11 1
ˆ 0( , ) 0
11 ˆ () ()  () 1 ((,)
ˆˆ () () in in
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  A stationary equilibrium is defined by constant aggregate variables over time and free entry for 
firms into the industry. In equilibrium, the distribution of firms can be represented as follows:  
ˆ () ((, ) ) ˆ if   , ˆ and   ( , )
ˆ () (,)








⎧ ≥ ≤ ⎪ = ⎨
⎪ ⎩
 
  We show in Appendix 1C that there is a unique equilibrium that satisfies the exit function 
condition, zero cut-off profit condition, free entry condition, and two aggregate stability conditions. 
These require that the mass of successful entrants in each period exactly replaces the mass of  
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incumbents who are hit by a bad shock and exit, and that the mass of firms with high volatility and 
productivity is not too high
11.  
 
3. Open  economy  model 
3.1  Effects of trade on the probability of bankruptcy 
We now assume that there are two identical countries that trade the varieties of Y. Trade involves two 
types of costs. First, there is a sunk entry cost into the foreign market,  ex f . Every period, the firm pays 
the amortized per-period portion of this cost, denoted by  x I . As in the closed economy framework, 
every period, exporters borrow a fixed amount from the bank. Second, there is a variable per unit cost 
of product that is transported. This variable cost takes the form of an iceberg cost, so that for one unit of 
a good to arrive to the final destination,  1 > τ  units of the good need to be shipped. While prices in the 
domestic market are the same as before, i.e.  () 1 ( ) d p ϕ ρϕ = , exporters set higher prices in the foreign 
market, due to the increase in the marginal cost. These are given by  () ( ) x p ϕ τρ ϕ = . In the absence of 
bankruptcy, the profits of an exporter in the domestic and the foreign markets are respectively: 
(1 ) ,
d




Π= − −+    and   (1 ) ,
x




Π= − −+  where  x r  is the 
interest rate paid by exporters,  xt z  (zdt) is the income shock in the foreign (domestic) market, and yx (yd) 
is the amount produced in the foreign (domestic) market. We assume that the income shock in the 
foreign market is normally distributed, with mean equal to one and variance σx
2. As in the closed 
economy model, the domestic shock, has mean one and variance σd
2. When firms start exporting, their 
probability of bankruptcy and their access to external finance change. If national and international 
shocks are correlated, we can aggregate both shocks and model them as a total income shock, normally 
distributed with variance σT
2 (given by the sum of the national and international income variances plus 
two times the covariance between the two shocks). The probability of bankruptcy of an exporter is the 
cumulative normal distribution shown in the following expression: 
2
2















== ∫∫ ,       (13) 
                                                 
11 This last condition is necessary to guarantee that as the minimum productivity increases, the ratio of average to 
minimum productivity decreases; and average volatility, increases, stays constant, or does not decrease too much. 
These are sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium (see Appendix 1C for details). Several studies 
have shown that the distribution of firms’ productivity has a positive skew. We find a similar feature for both the 
distribution of volatility and that of productivity in the panel of UK firms that we use in Sections 5 and 6 to test 
the main predictions of our model.  
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with a threshold shock that solves:  () ( ) / ( ) ( 1 ) 0 T dd xx d x x x zp y p y y y II r ϕ + −+ − + + =  
  If the covariance between national and international shocks is negative, and larger in absolute 
value than σx
2/2, then total earnings volatility decreases with trade
12. Furthermore, when the fixed cost 
of exporting is zero, the threshold shock of an exporter is always lower than that of a non-exporter. To 
ensure that the threshold shock of an exporter is always lower than that of a non-exporter, the fixed 
export cost should not be too high. In particular, the following inequality needs to hold: 
1 (1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( 1) xx x d Ir I r r r y
αα τ ττ ϕ
−− ⎡⎤ +< −+ + + − ⎣⎦ . Consequently, if the covariance between 
national and international shocks is negative, and larger in absolute value than σx
2/2, and if the fixed 
cost of exporting is not too high, then the probability of bankruptcy decreases with trade. The bank 
charges an interest rate  x r  to exporters, such that the expected repayment of the loan equals the 
repayment of a riskless loan, solving the following equation: 
  [ ] 00 () () ( ) ( 1 ) () xx x x x x T IIrr r rII C δ σ +− = + + − + .      (14) 
  As long the conditions outlined above are satisfied, trade also reduces the exporters’ cost of 
external financing
13. The following Proposition summarizes the impact of trade on firms’ volatility and 
their probability of bankruptcy.  
 
Proposition 3: If demand shocks in the national and international markets are negatively correlated, 
trade can lead to a reduction of total earnings volatility, through market diversification. If the fixed cost 
of exporting is not too high, trade can also reduce the firm’s probability of bankruptcy. 
 
  The intuition behind this Proposition is that if trade smoothes firms’ earnings and, if it is not too 
costly to export compared with selling only domestically, it can reduce firms’ financial constraints. The 
income diversification associated with trade can in fact decrease the exporters’ probability of 
bankruptcy, and, consequently, reduce their costs of accessing external finance, improving their 
financial health. This result is consistent with an early study of Hirsch and Lev (1971) based on data 
from Denmark, the Netherland, and Israel, which finds that exports tend to stabilize firms’ sales through 
market diversification. It is also in line with the work of Campa and Shaver (2002), who, using a panel 
of Spanish firms, show that exporters have more stable cash flows than non-exporters, and are 
consequently less financially constrained; and with a recent empirical article by Buch et al. (2006), who 
                                                 
12 Note that this result does not imply that trade leads to a decrease in macroeconomic volatility, as firm volatility 
and macroeconomic volatility are not necessarily positively related. In fact, Comin and Mulani (2005) document a 
negative linkage between firm-level and aggregate volatility.  
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find that trade decreases German firms’ output volatility. Finally, Proposition 3 could provide a 
theoretical foundation for the outcome described in Greenaway et al. (2007), who have empirically 
shown that trade improves the financial health of UK firms.  
 
3.2  Exit functions under free trade and incentives to trade 
As in the autarky case, the exit function for non-exporters is given by the following expression:  
[]
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In order to obtain the exit function for exporters, we need to determine the interest rate that 
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where  T ϕ  is the average productivity in the market under free trade. Substituting this expression into 
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Let us define  ˆ ˆ ϕ  as the level of productivity such that  ˆ ˆ (, ) 0 XT s ϕϕ = . Substituting it into the 
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.  
We show, in Appendix 1D, that the exit function of exporters can be expressed in terms of the 
minimum productivity level in the market as follows: 
                                                                                                                                                          
13 This obviously holds under the assumption that the collateral of exporters is greater than or equal to that of non-
exporters, which is a reasonable assumption considering that exporters are typically larger than non-exporters 
(Clerides et al., 1998; Bernard and Jensen, 1999; Aw et al., 2000).  
14 The aggregate price in the open economy model is 
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, where c is the constant 
that relates  ˆ ϕ  with  T ϕ . An equilibrium with exporters and non-exporters requires that  ˆ ˆˆ ϕ ϕ > . This 
condition holds if the fixed cost for exporting is not too low, i.e. if:  
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.          ( 1 6 )  
If  (1 ) / τ αα >− ,              ( 1 7 )  
the slope of the exit function of exporters is higher than that of non-exporters. Let us assume that 
conditions (16) and (17) hold
15. In this case, the exit functions for exporters and non-exporters intersect 
at a unique point, which determines the minimum level of productivity required to acquire a loan and to 
become an exporter. Let us denote this level of productivity with  ˆx ϕ . Figure 5 shows that the economy 
can be divided into four types of firms. The first type consists of firms with productivity lower than  ˆ ϕ , 
which cannot obtain any loan and cannot produce. The second type consists of firms with productivity 
between  ˆ ϕ  and  ˆ ˆ ϕ , and volatility below  ˆ (, ) s a ϕ ϕ , which can obtain a loan to sell their products 
domestically. The third type of firms are firms with productivity between  ˆ ˆ ϕ  and  ˆx ϕ , and volatility 
below  ˆ (, ) s a ϕ ϕ , which can obtain a loan to export, but find it more profitable to sell only in the 
domestic market. Finally, firms with productivity higher than  ˆx ϕ  and volatility below  ˆ (, ) X sc ϕ ϕ  obtain 
a loan to export, and decide to export. In Appendix 1E, we illustrate the conditions for the existence of a 
unique stationary equilibrium in the open economy, in which the minimum productivity level is higher 
than in autarky.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 5 
 
3.3  Effects of opening up to trade 
We now analyze the effect of opening up to trade on the distribution of firms in the market and their 
access to external finance. Trade increases the minimum productivity in the market, leading to different 
responses of the exit functions of exporters and non-exporters. The exit function for non-exporters is 
shifted to the right, and becomes flatter than in autarky. This implies that non-exporters with low 
                                                 
15 There are, in fact, three alternative scenarios. First, neither condition (16) nor condition (17) holds. In this case, 
there is no trade. Second, if condition (16) holds, but condition (17) does not hold, there is again no trade. Third, if 
condition (16) does not hold, but condition (17) holds, then only firms with low productivity and low volatility 
trade, which is not a realistic scenario.   
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productivity and low volatility exit the market. Due to the increased competition, these firms cannot 
obtain a loan anymore.  
  For exporters, there are two possible cases. The first occurs if the slope of the exit function is 
higher than the slope of the exit function in autarky, i.e. if: 
1









− −− ⎛⎞ +> ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
, where  ˆFT ϕ , and  ˆA ϕ  represent the minimum level of productivity in the 
market under free trade and autarky respectively (Figure 6a). In this case, firms with high volatility and 
high productivity can operate in the new stationary equilibrium. These companies were unable to obtain 
credit before the trade liberalization, due to their high volatility. Following the liberalization, they can 
smooth their earnings as they trade, becoming less volatile. Trade liberalization produces therefore a 
reallocation of firms in the market, whereby firms with low/medium productivity and volatility are 
replaced with firms with high productivity and volatility, increasing therefore average productivity in 
the market. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 6a  
 
  The second case occurs if the slope of the exit function for exporters is lower than or equal to 
that of the exit function in autarky (Figure 6b). Here, due to the large increase in competition, the 
increase in the minimum level of productivity under free trade is much higher than in autarky. This 
leads to a reduction of external funds for all firms that were close to the autarky exit function. These 
firms are now forced to exit the market, and there is no reallocation of companies. Due to increased 
competition, opening up to trade induces such a decrease in earnings for the local firms, that not even 
exporters become less financially constrained than in autarky. Thus, in this situation, there is no gain 
from trade for the domestic firms. Consequently, contrary to Melitz (2003), in this case, trade does not 
necessarily increase average productivity. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 6b  
 
In sum, the effect of a trade liberalization on the distribution of firms in the market is ambiguous, and 
depends on its effect on firms’ access to external finance. 
3.4  Volatility and the incentive to trade 
We now turn to a related question: do firms with high national income volatility have more incentives 
to trade than firms with low national income volatility? In our model, this can happen if firms are able 
to diversify their income shocks by exporting.   
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  Let us denote with  (, ) xT ϕ σ Π  and  (, ) d ϕ σ Π , the average expected profits for exporters and 
non-exporters respectively, in the absence of bankruptcy; with  x r , the interest rate charged to exporters; 
and with  nx r  the interest rate charged to non-exporters. The differential in firm value for exporters and 
non-exporters (for positive expected profits) is given by  (, ) / (, ) /. xT x d ϕ σδ ϕ σδ Π −Π   
  Firms with high national income volatility have more incentives to trade than firms with low 
volatility if this value differential increases with domestic income volatility. As shown in Proposition 1, 









However, this is not necessarily the case with trade if there is diversification. If a firm sells to markets 
characterized by negatively correlated income shocks, we can observe two scenarios in which the 
differential in firm value for exporters and non-exporters can increase with domestic income volatility. 
The first occurs if the interest rate of exporters does not change for different degrees of national income 








). This may happen if exporters with high domestic volatility do not have 
higher total volatility, due to diversification. In this situation, firms with high domestic income 
volatility have more incentives to trade than firms with low domestic income volatility, as they are able 
to diversify their income shocks relatively more than low volatility firms. Exporters and non-exporters 
end up having a similar total volatility, independently of their domestic income volatility. For this 
reason more volatile firms have more incentives to trade. 
  The second scenario occurs if exporters with high domestic volatility are charged a higher 








). In this situation, if the 
increase in interest rate associated with higher domestic volatility is lower for exporters than for non-








, which would occur if following a rise in domestic volatility, the total 
volatility of exporters remained constant or increased little, thanks to diversification), and if this 
advantage in terms of interest rates is sufficiently large as to counter balance the rise in the fixed cost 
necessary to export, then firms with high domestic income volatility have, once again, more incentives 
to export than firms with low domestic income volatility. This occurs because, in this case, the 
differential in the firm’s value for exporters and non-exporters increases with domestic volatility. 




Proposition 4: Firms with high national income volatility have more incentives to trade than firms with 
low national income volatility, provided that the increase in the interest rate associated with a higher 
domestic volatility is lower for exporters than for non-exporters, and provided that this advantage in 
terms of interest rate counterbalances the increase in the amortized per-period portion of the fixed cost 
that exporters have to face. 
 
  Intuitively, before starting to export, firms with low domestic income volatility can obtain a 
loan at a lower cost than firms with high domestic income volatility. This generates incentives for firms 
with low volatility to start exporting. However, for highly volatile firms, the prospective reduction in 
the total volatility is larger than for firms with low volatility, which in turn reduces their interest rates 
and encourages them to trade.  
 
4. Testable  implications 
From the analysis of our theoretical model, several testable implications emerge. First, the model 
suggests that controlling for productivity and collateral, firms with higher volatility have a higher 
probability of bankruptcy. It is consequently more costly for them to obtain external finance. Second, 
the model implies that there is a positive correlation between volatility and productivity for high levels 
of volatility, while there is no correlation for low levels: highly volatile firms need to be more 
productive to stay in the market. Third, the open economy model suggests that, through market 
diversification, exports tend to stabilize firms’ total sales. Exporters’ total income volatility will 
therefore be lower than their national income volatility. Finally, firms characterized by high national 
income volatility will have more incentives to start exporting than firms with low volatility. In the 
Sections that follow, we will test these implications using a panel of 9292 UK firms over the period 
1993-2003. Our choice of the UK in our empirical testing of the model stems from the fact that the UK 
is the fifth largest exporter of manufactures globally, and within our sample, almost 70 percent of all 
firms exported in at least one year. Moreover, on average, 30 percent of the total sales of UK exporters 
are directed abroad. 
 
5.  Data and summary statistics 
5.1 The  dataset 
We construct our dataset from profit and loss and balance sheet data gathered by Bureau Van Dijk in 
the Financial Analysis Made Easy (FAME) database. This provides information on firms for the period 
1993-2003. It includes a majority of firms which are not traded on the stock market, or are quoted on 




16. Unquoted firms are more likely to be characterized by adverse financial attributes such as a 
short track record, poor solvency, and low real assets compared to quoted firms, which are typically 
large, financially healthy, long-established firms with good credit ratings.  
  The firms in our dataset operate in the manufacturing sector. We excluded firms that changed 
the date of their accounting year-end by more than a few weeks, so that data refer to 12 month 
accounting periods. Firms that did not have complete records on the variables used in our regressions 
were also dropped. Finally, to control for outliers, we excluded observations in the one percent tails for 
each variable
17. Our panel therefore comprises a total of 51668 annual observations on 9292 firms, 
covering the years 1993-2003. It has an unbalanced structure, with an average of 7 observations per 
firm. By allowing for both entry and exit, the use of an unbalanced panel partially mitigates potential 
selection and survivor bias. 
 
5.2 Summary  statistics 
Summary statistics of the main variables used in our empirical analysis are presented in Table 1. 
Column 1 refers to the entire sample; column 2 and 3, to surviving and failed firms, respectively. As in 
Bunn and Redwood (2003), we define a firm as failed (bankrupt) in a given year if its status is in 
receivership, liquidation, or dissolved
18. Columns 4 and 5 of Table 1 refer respectively to low and high 
volatility firms. Firm i is classified as a low (high) volatility firm in year t if its total volatility in year t 
is in the lowest (highest) 50 percent of the distribution of the volatilities of all firms operating in its 
same industry in year t. Columns 6 and 7 respectively refer to non-exporters at time t-1 that did not 
enter (non-starters), and entered (starters) export markets at t.  
  As in Comin and Mulani (2004) and Comin and Philippon (2005), our main volatility measure 
is calculated as the standard deviation of the firm’s total real sales growth, measured over a rolling 
window of 5 years. Specifically, denoting with Totalvolit this standard deviation for firm i at time t; with 
srgrit, the growth rate of the real sales of firm i at time t, and with µit, its average sales growth rate 
between t-2 and t+2, we have: 
                                                 
16 We only selected firms that have unconsolidated accounts: this ensures the majority of firms in our dataset are 
relatively small. Moreover, it avoids the double counting of firms belonging to groups, which would be included 
in the dataset if firms with consolidated accounts were also part of it. 
17 These cut-offs are aimed at eliminating observations reflecting particularly large mergers, extraordinary firm 
shocks, or coding errors. See Appendix 2 for more information on the structure of our panel and complete 
definitions of all variables used. 
18 Liquidation and receivership are two types of reorganization procedures, which can take place when a firm 
becomes insolvent. In liquidation, the assets of the firm are sold so as to meet the claims of creditors. In 
receivership, the receiver can decide whether it is in the creditors’ interests to sell the firm’s assets. Generally, it is 
in the creditors’ interests to liquidate if the liquidation value of the firm exceeds its going concern value (Lennox, 
1999b).   
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  We also provide measures of volatility only based on national sales growth and overseas sales 
growth, which we denote respectively with Nationalvolit
 and with Overseasvolit
19.  
  Comparing total sales growth volatility at failed and surviving firms (columns 2 and 3), we can 
see that the former display a higher volatility (0.207) than the latter (0.199). The difference between the 
two figures is marginally statistically significant (t-statistic: 1.69). In accordance with the first testable 
implication of our model, there is some evidence that failed firms are more volatile than their surviving 
counterparts. More formal tests of this hypothesis will be provided in the Section that follows.  
  Focusing now on columns 4 and 5, with emphasis on productivity (TFP), which is calculated 
using the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) method
20, it appears that both high and low volatility firms 
display very similar levels of productivity (5.820 and 5.826, respectively). Yet the correlation between 
TFP and volatility is positive for high-volatility firms (0.0650) and negative for low-volatility firms (-
0.0655). This seems to support our model’s second prediction, according to which one should observe a 
positive correlation between idiosyncratic volatility and productivity for high levels of volatility only. 
  Next, in relation to our open economy model’s predictions, we compare the firm’s total, 
national, and overseas sales growth volatility, based on the entire sample (column 1). We can see that, 
as suggested by our model, the volatility of total sales growth (0.197) is lower than that of national sales 
growth (0.238). The difference between the two means is strongly significant (t-statistic = 29.86). Also 
considering that overseas sales display the highest volatility (0.482), this provides some preliminary 
support for the hypothesis that, through market diversification, exports tend to stabilize total sales
21.  
  Finally, focusing on columns 6 and 7 of Table 1, we can see that starters display a much higher 
national sales volatility compared to non-starters (0.309 versus 0.193). The difference between the two 
means is statistically significant (t-statistic = 7.63). Although this comparison is simply based on 
                                                 
19 It should be noted that given the way in which we calculate volatility, this variable is not available for the years 
1993, 1994, 2002, and 2003. For this reason, all regressions which contain our main measure of volatility are 
based on the sample 1995-2001. This explains why the number of observations reported in Tables 2 to 4 is lower 
than that reported in Table 1, which refers to the full sample. 
20 A key issue in the estimation of production functions is the correlation between unobservable productivity 
shocks and input levels. Profit-maximizing firms respond to positive productivity shocks by expanding output, 
which requires additional inputs; and to negative shocks, by decreasing output and input usage. Olley and Pakes’ 
(1996) estimator uses investment as a proxy for these unobservable shocks. This could cause problems as any 
observation with zero investment would have to be dropped from the data. Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), by 
contrast, introduce an estimator which uses intermediate inputs as proxies, arguing that these (which are generally 
non-zero) are likely to respond more smoothly to productivity shocks. 
21 If we limit the sample to exporters, the volatility of total sales growth is given by 0.198; that of national sales 
growth, by 0.248; and that of overseas sales growth, by 0.479.  
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unconditional means, it provides some strong support for our model’s last testable implication. More 
formal tests of all the implications of our model are provided in the next Section.  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 
 
6.  Specifications and results 
6.1  Are more volatile firms more likely to go bankrupt?  
In order to test the first implication of our model, namely that more volatile firms are more likely to fail, 
we will estimate a random-effects Probit specification of the following type: 
 
Pr(FAILit=1) =Φ( a0 + a1 sizeit + a2 ageit + a3 groupi + a4 TFPit + 
+ a5 Collateralit/Debtit*+ a6 Totalvol+ ui+  uj + ut )      ( 1 8 )  
 
FAILit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i failed in year t, and 0 otherwise. Φ(.) denotes the 
standard normal distribution function. As typically done in the literature (see for instance Bunn and 
Redwood, 2003; and Disney et al., 2003), our equation controls for firm’s size, age, productivity, and 
for whether the firm is part of a group. In accordance with our model, we also include the firm’s 
collateral to debt ratio and the volatility of its total sales growth among the regressors
22. Since the 
average length of time between the final annual report of a failing firm and its entry into bankruptcy is 
usually 14 months (Lennox, 1999a), our specification includes regressors evaluated at time t. Yet, all 
our results were robust to using lagged regressors. The error term is made up of three components: ui, 
ut, and uj. ui represents a firm-specific effect, and is controlled for by our random-effects estimator. ut 
represents a time-specific effect accounting for business cycle conditions, and is taken into account by 
including a full set of time dummies. uj represents a sector-specific effect, and is controlled for by 
including a full set of industry dummies
23.  
  The estimates of Equation (18) are presented in column 1 of Table 2. As typically found in the 
literature, size and TFP have a negative effect on the firm’s probability of failure. The coefficient 
associated with the ratio of the firm’s collateral to total debt is poorly determined suggesting that this 
variable does not play a statistically significant effect on firm survival. In accordance with Proposition 1 
                                                 
22 In the model, we assumed that firms have the same level of debt, but different levels of collateral. In reality, 
however, different firms have different levels of debt. For this reason, we control for the ratio of collateral over 
debt. All our results were robust to including collateral and total debt separately in the regressions. 
23 Firms are allocated to the following industrial groups: metals and metal goods; other minerals, and mineral 
products; chemicals and man made fibres; mechanical engineering; electrical and instrument engineering; motor 
vehicles and parts, other transport equipment; food, drink, and tobacco; textiles, clothing, leather, and footwear; 
and others (Blundell et al., 1992).  
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in our model, the volatility of the firm’s total sales growth is positively associated with the chances that 
the firm will go bankrupt: more volatile firms are therefore more likely to fail. 
  As an alternative test of this first implication of the model, we make use of the Quiscore 
measure produced by Qui Credit Assessment Ltd., which assesses the likelihood of firm failure in the 
12 months following the date of calculation. The lower its Quiscore, the more risky the firm, and the 
higher its chances of failure. We estimate the following fixed-effects regression: 
 
QUISCOREit = a0 + a1 sizeit + a2 ageit +  a3 TFPit + 
+ a4 Collateralit/Debtit + a5 Totalvol+ ui+  ut       (19) 
 
  The results are presented in column 2 of Table 2. TFP is positively associated with Quiscore, 
suggesting that more productive firms are less risky, and less likely to fail
24. Our collateral to debt ratio 
is also positively associated with Quiscore, indicating that the more collateral a firm has relative to its 
total debt, the less risky it is. Surprisingly, our size variable is negatively associated with Quiscore, 
suggesting  that larger firms are more risky. Finally, our volatility measure displays a negative 
coefficient: more volatile firms are more risky, and therefore more likely to fail, which is in accordance 
with our Proposition 1. 
  As banks generally look at firms’ credit ratings such as Quiscore when deciding the terms of 
the loans they make to firms, it is likely that they will charge higher interest rates to the riskiest firms. 
Thus, as predicted by our model, more volatile firms are more likely to fail, and to be charged higher 
interest rates by their lenders. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 
 
6.2 Is there a positive correlation between productivity and volatility for highly volatile firms only? 
The second main implication of our model is that there should be a positive correlation between 
productivity and volatility for highly volatile firms only. In order to test this implication, we construct 
the following two dummies: LOWVOLit, which is equal to one if firm i’s total real sales growth 
volatility in year t is in the lowest half of the distribution of the volatilities of all firms operating in the 
same industry as firm i’s in year t, and 0 otherwise; and HIGHVOLit, which is equal to one if firm i’s 
volatility in year t is in the highest half of the distribution, and 0 otherwise. We then interact our 
                                                 
24 Industry dummies are not included in this regression, as they are automatically wiped out in the differencing 
process undertaken by the fixed-effects estimator.  
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TFPit = a0 + a1totalvolit*LOWVOlit+ a2totalvolit*HIGHVOlit + ui + ut+ eit  (20) 
 
The coefficient a1 can be interpreted as the effect of volatility on TFP for firms with low volatility; and 
a2, as the effect for firms with high volatility. The estimates are reported in column 1 of Table 3. We 
can see that only a2 is statistically significant. This suggests that volatility only affects the productivity 
of those firms characterized by a high volatility. This is consistent with our model’s second prediction. 
Column 2 reports the results when firms are divided in three categories based on their volatility: there 
are three interaction terms: one for low-volatility firms, one for medium-volatility firms, and one for 
high-volatility firms
26. Once again, there is a positive association between volatility and TFP only for 
high-volatility firms, which supports our model’s second prediction. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 
 
6.3  Are more volatile firms more likely to start exporting? 
Lastly, our model predicts that it is those firms that display highest volatility of national sales growth 
that should have more incentives to start exporting. In order to test this prediction, we estimate the 
following random-effects Probit equation for the probability that a non-exporter at time t-1 becomes an 
exporter at t: 
STARTit =  a0 + a1 sizeit +  a2 ageit +  a3 TFPit + a4 groupi +  
+a5 nationalvolit+ uj + ut+ eit        ( 2 1 )  
 
  The dependent variable, STARTit, is equal to one for those firms that exported at t, but not at t-1, 
and 0 otherwise. As in the regression for firm failure, our right-hand side variables include the firm’s 
size, its age, its TFP, and the dummy indicating whether it is part of a group. To test our model’s 
prediction, we have added the volatility of the firm’s national sales growth among our regressors. The 
results are presented in column 1 of Table 4
27. We can see that larger firms are more likely to enter 
                                                 
25 Once again, industry dummies are not included in this specification. 
26 In this case the interaction dummies are defined as follows: LOWVOLit is equal to one if firm i’s total real sales 
growth volatility in year t is in the lowest 33 percent of the distribution of the volatilities of all firms operating in 
the same industry as firm i’s in year t, and 0 otherwise; MIDDLEVOLit is equal to one if firm i’s volatility in year t 
is in the middle 33 percent of the distribution, and 0 otherwise; and HIGHVOLit is equal to one if firm i’s volatility 
in year t is in the highest 33 percent of the distribution, and 0 otherwise. 
27 The sample used in this regression is therefore only made up of firms that did not export at time t-1. This 
explains the low number of observations reported in this Table.  
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export markets, and that the volatility of national sales growth is also positively associated with the 
probability that the firm starts exporting. Yet, it should be noted that our previous measure of volatility, 
calculated over a rolling window of five years is based on the firm’s national sales before and after 
entry in the foreign market. This could introduce bias in the regression. We therefore verify whether our 
results are robust to using two different measures of national sales volatility: the first is the standard 
deviation of the firm’s real sales growth calculated over the five years preceding and including year t. 
The second one is calculated in a similar way but using all years preceding and including year t. The 
results based on these two alternative measures of volatility are presented in columns 2 and 3 of Table 
4. We can see that in both cases, a higher volatility is still positively associated with a higher probability 
to start exporting. Thus, as predicted by the model, those firms displaying high volatility in their 
national real sales are also more likely to start exporting. In summary, the data seem to lend strong 
support our model. 
 
INSERT TABLE 4 
 
7. Conclusion 
We have constructed a dynamic model of monopolistic competition, aimed at studying the impact of 
firms’ earnings volatility on the degree of financial constraints that they face, and on their probabilities 
of survival, and of entering export markets. Our model predicts that high earnings volatility may 
prevent some firms from obtaining loans, and that more volatile firms are more likely to go bankrupt, 
need to be more productive to stay in the market, and have more incentives to enter export markets. We 
show that trade allows exporters to smooth their income, leading to a decrease in the degree of financial 
constraints that they face, and in their expected average probability of bankruptcy. Yet, since trade also 
increases competition, there can be two possible equilibria. If competition is not too high, there is a 
reallocation of firms in the market, whereby firms with low productivity and low volatility are 
substituted by exporters with high productivity and high volatility. However, if competition is very 
high, it is possible that all firms become more financially constrained than in autarky. In this 
circumstance, trade does not necessary increase the average productivity in the industry. We have tested 
our model’s predictions, using a panel of 9292 UK manufacturing firms over the period 1993-2003. In 
line with the model’s predictions, we found empirical evidence showing that more volatile firms are 
more likely to go bankrupt, need to be more productive to stay in the market, and are more likely to 
enter export markets, and that exports tend to stabilize firms’ total sales, through market diversification.  
  Our analysis has some limitations. We found that when firms export, their earnings volatility 
can decrease, improving their financial situation. Yet, we considered the decrease in volatility as the 
only channel through which exporters can improve their financial situation, leaving aside other possible  
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factors that may shield exporters from liquidity constraints such as improvements in their reputation, 
enhancement in the quality of their products through the adoption of international standards, and access 
not only to domestic, but also to foreign credit markets
28. The latter channel is particularly important, 
especially in the absence of perfect competition in the domestic market for loans, as we have implicitly 
assumed. Furthermore, in our model, all firms are assumed to borrow the same quantity, and they 
cannot use their own previous resources to finance their production fixed costs. We abstract therefore 
from the role of firms’ age and of their current capital structure (with the exception of their collateral). 
Finally, we do not analyze how trade might increase firms’ earnings volatility, for example through a 
rise in the exchange rate volatility. This effect is particularly important in developing countries that 
open up to trade (Chaney, 2005; Razin et al., 2003). More research, both empirical and theoretical, is 
necessary to fully understand the interactions between volatility, financial constraints, and trade.  
 
 
APPENDIX 1: Proofs 
 
A.  Proof of Proposition 1 
We wish to show that given two firms (i and j), which only differ in their volatilities (for example 
j i σ σ > ), the more volatile firm has a higher probability of bankruptcy than the less volatile one (i.e. 
j i δ δ > ). To this end, we construct the proof in two parts.  
We initially show that if the threshold shock z  is the same for both firms, then the firm with 
higher volatility has a higher probability of bankruptcy. Let us denote with  () f dz  the distribution of 
shocks of firm i, and with  () g dz  the distribution of shocks of firm j. By assumption, the firms have the 
same productivity level. Let  z ˆ  be the point where both distributions intersect. If  ˆ zz > , Figure A1 




> ∫∫ , and therefore  j i δ δ > .  
 
INSERT FIGURE A1 
 
If, on the other hand,  ˆ zz < , focusing on Figure A2, we can see that the probability of 
bankruptcy can be expressed as  C B A i + + = δ  for firm i, and as  D C B j + + = δ  for firm j. If 
                                                 
28 See, for example, Bridges and Guariglia (2006), for a summary of the literature on the reduced effects of 
liquidity constraints on the behavior of exporters, relative to purely domestic firms.   
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A D > , then  j i δ δ > . The properties of the normal distribution imply that 
A+B+C+F=B+D+C+E+F=1/2, therefore A=D+E. Since we have assumed that  1 z < , this leads to 
0 E > , and therefore to  A D > , which, provided that the threshold shock is the same for both firms, 
implies again that the firm with higher volatility has a higher probability of bankruptcy. (Note that this 
result also holds if the threshold shock is higher for the more volatile company). 
 
INSERT FIGURE A2  
 
  Next, we wish to show that the threshold shock cannot be lower for the more volatile firm. To 
this end, considering that the interest rate is higher for the more volatile firm, we only need to show that 
it is more costly for the latter to obtain external funding. Let us prove this by contradiction. Suppose 
that it were not more costly for the more volatile firm to obtain financial resources. In this case, 
assuming that they borrow the same amount, two firms with the same productivity and different 
volatilities would be charged the same interest rate. The threshold shock would consequently be the 
same for both firms. If the threshold shock is the same, then we have shown that the probability of 
bankruptcy is higher for the more volatile firm. Additionally, we know that the collateral is lower for 
the more volatile firm. Yet, if the probability of bankruptcy is higher, and the collateral is lower for the 
more volatile firm, it cannot be true that the two firms are charged the same interest rate. Therefore, the 
threshold shock has to be higher for the more volatile firm than for the less volatile one, and 
consequently, the former firm has a higher probability of bankruptcy than the latter. Q.E.D. 
 
B.  Proof that the functions that determine the equilibrium interest rates intersect at a unique point 
The equilibrium interest rate is given by the following equation: 
0 ( * ) ( *, , , )[(1 *) ( )] 0 Ir r r r I C δ ϕσϕ σ −− + − =        ( A 1 )  
We have defined  10 () ( ) , j rI r r = −  and  2( , , , ) ( , , , )[(1 ) ( )] jr r r I C ϕ σϕ δ ϕσϕ σ = +− . We wish to 
show that these two functions intersect at a unique point.  
First of all, we show that both  1() j r  and  2(, , , ) jr ϕ σϕ are increasing functions of r in the 
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We know that when  0 (1 ) ( ) rI C σ + > , at  0 r , 
10 20 0 0 () 0 (,,,) (,,,) [ ( 1 ) () ] jr jr r rI C ϕ σϕ δ ϕσϕ σ =< = + − . At r %,  10 () ( ) j rI r r =− %%  and 
2
1
( , , , ) ( , , , )[(1 ) ( )] [ ( , ) ( )]
2
jr r r I C d C ϕ σϕ δ ϕσϕ σ ϕϕ σ =+ − = − %%% . It follows that, if 
0 (,) 2( 1 ) () dI r C ϕ ϕσ >+ − , at r %,  12 () (, , , ) jr jr ϕ σϕ > %% . Therefore, by the intermediate value 
theorem, when  0 (,) () 2( 1 ) dC I r ϕ ϕσ + >+ , there exists a unique  0 *[, ] rr r ∈ %  in which both functions 
intersect and Equation (A1) holds (see Figure 2). 
It is important to note that the function  2(, , , ) jr ϕ σϕ is continuous with respect to ϕ  and σ . 
As productivity decreases, the threshold shock that leads to zero profit increases, which implies an 
increase of the probability of bankruptcy. A decrease in the firm’s productivity shifts therefore the 
function  2(, , , ) jr ϕ σϕ upward, while the function  1() j r remains constant. Therefore, firms with lower 
productivity are charged a higher interest rate than those with higher productivity.  
Furthermore, as volatility increases, there is an increase in the probability of bankruptcy (as 
shown in Proposition 1), and a decrease in the expected collateral. These two effects also cause an 
upward shift in the function  2(, , , ) jr ϕ σϕ, and an increase in the interest rate.  
Thus, a decrease in productivity or an increase in volatility increases the interest rate, and at the 
same time, decreases  (,) () dC ϕ ϕσ + , until the maximum possible interest rate for a firm r % is reached 
when  0 (,) () 2( 1 ) dC I r ϕ ϕσ += + . This guarantees that the function  2 j  does not intersect  1 j  twice in 
the interval  0 [,] rr % , and avoids therefore the possibility that a firm gets charged two interest rates in this 
interval. Q.E.D. 
 
C.  Proof of the existence and uniqueness of a stationary equilibrium in the closed economy 









Π= .              ( A 2 )   
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Average profits can also be expressed in terms of the profits of a firm with minimum productivity in the 
market as: 
1







− ⎧⎫ ⎛⎞ ⎪⎪ Π= + − + ⎨⎬ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ⎪⎪ ⎩⎭
.             ( A 3 )  
We wish to find a unique  ˆ ϕ  such that Equations (A2) and (A3) hold. We know that the average 
interest rate is an increasing function of the average probability of bankruptcy and average volatility. 










, and positively on the average 
volatility. There is an equilibrium if, as  ˆ ϕ  goes from 0 to infinity, Equation (A3) decreases 
monotonically from infinity to zero, and Equation (A2) increases from a positive value to infinity.  
First, as  ˆ ϕ  goes to infinity, 
ˆ ˆ lim ( ) 0 in P
ϕ ϕ
→∞ → . Since the probability of bankruptcy is larger than 
zero, and the average interest rate is bounded (note that the maximum interest rate is the rate leading to 
an expected profit which goes to zero as  ˆ ϕ  goes to infinity), then Equation (A3) goes to zero and 
Equation (A2) to infinity.  
Second, as  ˆ ϕ  goes to zero, 
ˆ 0
ˆ lim ( ) 1 in P
ϕ ϕ




ˆ lim ( ) ( ) hd
αα
ϕ σ ϕσ σ σ σ
∞
−−
→ = = ∫ % , where 
σ % is a constant. This implies that both the average probability of bankruptcy, and the average interest 
rates are also constants. Therefore, as  ˆ ϕ  goes to zero, Equation (A3) goes to infinity and Equation (A2) 
tends to a constant positive value.  










 is a decreasing 
function of  ˆ ϕ , and that the average volatility is increasing, constant, or does not decrease too much 
with respect to  ˆ ϕ . We will show that the first condition holds if the distribution of volatilities is such 
that the majority of firms do not have very high volatility. The second condition holds if the distribution 
of productivities is such that the majority of the firms do not have too high productivity. As discussed in 
footnote 11 in the paper, our data show that these conditions hold. 












is a decreasing function of  ˆ ϕ  
for any density function of volatility h. The density function can be expressed as a normalized  
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weighted average of the different values of a random variable. Let us consider the case in which the 
volatility distribution is concentrated around the value  0 0 h >  (see Figure A3).  
 
INSERT FIGURE A3 
 
The condition under which 
1






















































, and  0 ϕ  is the minimum productivity level such 
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. An increase 
in the minimum productivity level from  ˆ ϕ
0 to  ˆ ϕ
1 makes that firms with productivity levels between 
0
00 ˆ (,) h ϕϕ  and 
1
00 ˆ (,) h ϕϕ  exit the market. As volatility increases (i.e. as  0 h  increases), a larger 
number of firms with high productivity have to exit the market. If the productivity were distributed 
uniformly, this would lead to an increase in the average productivity in the market. Note that the 
increase in the average productivity is higher if the distribution of the volatilities is such that there are 












 to be a 
decreasing function of  ˆ ϕ  is that the proportion of firms in the market, characterized by high volatility is 
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We now determine the conditions under which the average volatility increases, remains 









, is ambiguous: it depends on the specific distribution functions of productivity and 
volatility.  
An increase in  ˆ ϕ  causes the exit function  ˆ (, ) s a ϕ ϕ  to shift downwards. This implies that some 
firms in the market cannot obtain a loan anymore, and therefore have to exit the market. Consider the 
example illustrated in Figure A4. If, initially (when  ˆ ϕ = ˆ ϕ
0), the distribution of firms in the market is 
formed by firms with low productivity and low volatility (firms in the circle labelled 1), and firms with 
high productivity and medium volatility (firms in the circle labelled 2), as  ˆ ϕ  increases (from  ˆ ϕ
0 to 
ˆ ϕ
1), the average volatility increases, as the firms in the circle labelled 1 have to exit the market. In this 
case, both the average interest rate and the average probability of bankruptcy increase, the entrance of 
new firms is bounded, and there is an equilibrium. 
 
INSERT FIGURE A4  
 
Let us now focus on Figure A5.  
 
INSERT FIGURE A5  
 
Let us suppose that there are two types of firms in the market when productivity is given by 
ˆ ϕ
0: firms with low volatility and low productivity (in circle 1), and firms with high volatility and high 
productivity (in circle 2). As  ˆ ϕ  increases to  ˆ ϕ
1, all firms in circle 2, as well as some of the firms in 
circle 1 will be forced to exit the market. Therefore, the average volatility in the market decreases, and 
both the average probability of bankruptcy and the average interest rate decrease as well. This effect is 
stronger if the proportion of firms with high productivity levels is very high. To see this, consider the 
case in which productivity is concentrated at the value  ´ ϕ , the maximum volatility in the market is  ´ σ , 


















. In this case, the derivative of σ  with 
respect to  ˆ ϕ  is always negative, and higher in absolute value, the higher the value of  ´ ϕ  (i.e. the higher 
the concentration of firms with high productivity in the market). Therefore, a necessary condition for 
average volatility to increase, remain constant, or not decrease too much, as  ˆ ϕ  rises, which itself is a 
sufficient condition to ensure that Equation (A3) is decreasing, and Equation (A2) increasing with  
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respect to  ˆ ϕ , is that the proportion of firms in the market with high productivity levels is not too high. 
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%% . 
To ensure the existence of an equilibrium, this derivative has to be positive, equal to 0, or negative, but 
small in absolute value. Q.E.D. 
 
D.  Proof that the exit function of exporters can be expressed in terms of the minimum productivity 
in the market. 
Solving  ˆˆ (,) (,) Xx T x T ss ϕ ϕϕ ϕ = , we obtain: 












. Rewriting this 




−  and substituting its value into Equation (15), we obtain the exit function of 
exporters, in terms of their minimum level of productivity, i.e. 
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, where b  is the constant 
that relates  ˆx ϕ  with  T ϕ . Equation (10) gives us the relationship between  ˆ ϕ  and the average 
productivity in the market. We can also express the minimum level of productivity of exporters in terms 
of this minimum level of productivity. Therefore, we obtain that 
11 0
00
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. Substituting this equation into the exit function for 
exporters, we are able to express this exit function in terms of the minimum productivity level in the 
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, where c is the constant 
that relates  ˆ ϕ  with  T ϕ . Q.E.D. 
 
E.  Proof of the existence and uniqueness of a stationary equilibrium in the open economy 
The free entry condition in the open economy is given by: 











Π= ,            ( A 4 )  





ˆˆ ˆ () () ((, ) ) () ( (, ) )
x
x
in x Pg H s a d g H s c d
ϕϕ
ϕϕ ϕ
ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕϕ ϕ ϕ ϕϕ
∞
=+ ∫∫ .    (A5) 
The zero profit condition now includes the profit in the foreign market. We denote with  (,) TT ϕ σ Π  the 
average profit in the economy with trade, which is equal to: 
[ ] ˆˆ (,) (, ) (, ) ( 1 ) ( ) ( 1 ) TT dT x T x n x x x x dd P I r P I I r ϕσ ϕϕ ϕϕ Π= + − + + + + .     (A6) 
In the above equation,  ˆ (, ) dT d ϕ ϕ , and  ˆ (, ) xT d ϕ ϕ  represent the average income minus the 
variable costs in the domestic and foreign markets, respectively; and 
ˆˆ ()








= ∫  is the probability of exporting, which also represents the 
percentage of firms in the market that export. The average interest rates of non-exporters and exporters 
are  nx r  and  x r , respectively. We wish to show that, like in the autarky case, as  ˆ ϕ  goes from 0 to 
infinity, Equation (A4) increases monotonically from a positive value to infinity, and Equation (A6) 
decreases monotonically from infinity to zero.  
First, as  ˆ ϕ  goes to infinity, the probability of entry, 
ˆˆ ()
ˆ () ( (, ) )
x




∫ ; and 
ˆˆ ()
ˆ
ˆ () ((, ) )
x
x g Hs c d
ϕϕ
ϕ
ϕ ϕϕ ϕ ∫ ), all go to zero. Appendix 1F below proves that the probability of entry is a 
decreasing function of  ˆ ϕ . Moreover, as in the autarky case, the average probability of bankruptcy is 
larger than zero, and the interest rates are bounded. This implies that as  ˆ ϕ  goes to infinity, the average 
interest rates and the probability of bankruptcy are constants. Therefore, Equation (A4) goes to infinity 
and Equation (A6) goes to zero.  
Second, as  ˆ ϕ  goes to zero, both the probability of entry and the probability of exporting go to 
one. Additionally, the average volatility tends to a constant, which we denote with σ % . This implies that 
Equation (A4) goes to a constant, and Equation (A6) to infinity. 













 is decreasing with respect to  ˆ ϕ , and that the average volatility is increasing, 
constant, or does not decrease too much with respect to  ˆ ϕ . These conditions are satisfied when the 
proportion of firms with high volatility and high productivity is not too high. In Equation (A6),  
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is not too large. As in the autarky case, the latter condition implies that the proportion of 
firms with high volatility is not too high. Moreover, the entrance of firms will be bounded, if, as  ˆ ϕ  
increases, the average volatility increases, remains constant, or does not decrease too much, which 
happens, as in autarky, when the proportion of firms with high productivity is not too large. Q.E.D. 
It is important to note that the minimum productivity in autarky is lower than under free trade. 
In a free trade equilibrium, the free entry condition is the same as in autarky, and is a decreasing 
function of  ˆ ϕ . However, considering that the zero profit condition is higher under free trade than in 
autarky (since the average profits are higher), this implies that the equilibrium  ˆ ϕ  has to be higher under 
free trade than in autarky. 
 
F.  Proof that, in the open economy, the probability of entry is a decreasing function of  ˆ ϕ . 
The derivative of the probability of entry with respect to the minimum productivity is: 
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Appendix 2: Data 
 




























































Total 9292  100.00   
 
Definitions of the variables used 
FAILit: dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i failed in year t, and 0 otherwise. We define a firm as failed 
(dead) in a given year if its firm status is in receivership, liquidation, or dissolved. 
Sizeit: logarithm of the firm’s total real assets. Total assets are given by the sum of fixed (tangible and 
intangible) assets and current assets, where current assets are defined as the sum of stocks, work-in-
progress inventories, trade and other debtors, cash and equivalents, and other current assets. 
Salesit: includes both UK and overseas turnover. 
Collateralit/Debtit: ratio between the firm’s tangible assets and its total (long- and short-term) debt. 
TFPit: total factor productivity calculated using the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) method. 
Groupi dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is part of a group, and 0 otherwise. A firm is said to be 
part of a group if it is a subsidiary of one or more holding firms (UK or foreign). Information about 
whether a firm is part of a group is only provided in the last year of observations available for each 
firm. We therefore assume that a firm which was part of a group or foreign owned in its last available 
year was part of a group or foreign owned throughout the period in which it was observed. Given the 
short sample that we analyze, this is a reasonable assumption. 
Quiscoreit is given as a number in the range from 0 to 100. The lower its Quiscore, the more risky a 
firm is likely to be. The indicator is constructed taking into account a number of factors, including the 
presence of any adverse documents appearing against the firm on the public file, and the timeliness of 
getting the accounts filed. However, the most important factors relate to the financial performance of  
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the firm as evidenced by its balance sheet and profit and loss accounts. The key financial items used 
include turnover, pre-tax profits, working capital, intangibles, cash and bank deposits, creditors, bank 
loans and overdrafts, current assets, current liabilities, net assets, fixed assets, share capital, reserves 
and shareholders funds. The underlying economic conditions are also taken into account. 
STARTit: dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i exported a positive amount in year t, but not in year t-1, 
and 0 otherwise. 
Totalvolit: standard deviation of the firm’s total real sales growth. The standard deviation is measured 
over a rolling window of 5 years.  
Nationalvolit: standard deviation of the firm’s real national sales growth. The standard deviation is 
measured over a rolling window of 5 years.  
Overseasvolit: standard deviation of the firm’s real overseas sales growth. The standard deviation is 
measured over a rolling window of 5 years.  
Prenationalvolit: standard deviation of the firm’s real sales calculated over the 5 years preceding and 
including year t.  
Prenationalvol1it: standard deviation of the firm’s real sales calculated over all years preceding and 
including year t.  
LOWVOLit: dummy variable equal to one if firm i’s Totalvol in year t is in the lowest 50 percent of the 
distribution of the Totalvols of all firms operating in the same industry as firm i’s in year t, and 0 
otherwise. 
HIGHVOLit: dummy variable equal to one if firm i’s Totalvol in year t is in the highest 50 percent of 
the distribution of the Totalvols of all firms operating in the same industry as firm i’s in year t, and 0 
otherwise. 
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FIGURE A1: Quantifying the probabilities of bankruptcy of two firms with different 
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FIGURE A2: Quantifying the probabilities of bankruptcy of two firms with different 
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FIGURE A3: Relationship between volatility distribution and changes in average 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 





































             
Sizeit  8.834 8.881 8.341  9.033  8.972  8.311  8.739 
  (1.41)  (1.42)  (1.15) (1.34)  (1.35)  (1.35) (1.40) 
Ageit  27.716  27.956  25.188 33.036  28.105  25.548 23.728 
  (24.13)  (24.24)  (22.70) (24.92)  (23.81)  (22.95) (21.27) 
TFPit  5.650 5.738 4.760  5.826  5.820  5.188  5.489 
  (2.44)  (2.48)  (1.84) (2.40)  (2.40)  (2.27) (2.51) 
Groupi  0.319 0.340 0.110  0.342  0.331  0.253  0.285 
  (0.47)  (0.47)  (0.31) (0.47)  (0.47)  (0.43) (0.45) 
Collateralit/Debtit  1.765 1.781 1.632  1.888  1.587  2.00  1.699 
  (3.52)  (3.56)  (3.11) (3.76)  (3.28)  (4.07) (2.63) 
Quiscoreit  54.867  55.644  46.720 59.459  54.069  55.138 51.127 
  (22.31)  (22.37)  (19.94) (20.98)  (21.74)  (21.77) (21.68) 
Totalvolit  0.197 0.199 0.207  0.092  0.306  0.190  0.238 
  (0.19)  (0.19)  (0.17) (0.04)  (0.22)  (0.21) (0.31) 
Nationalvolit  0.238 0.237 0.258  0.131  0.346  0.193  0.309 
  (0.27)  (0.27)  (0.30) (0.17)  (0.31)  (0.23) (0.42) 
Overseasvolit  0.482 0.479 0.546  0.370  0.593  0.389  0.771 




















Notes: FAILit: dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i failed in year t, and 0 otherwise. LOWVOLit/ HIGHVOLit: 
dummy variable equal to one if firm i’s Totalvol in year t is in the lowest (highest) 50 percent of the distribution of 
the Totalvols of all firms operating in the same industry as firm i’s in year t, and 0 otherwise. STARTit: dummy 
variable equal to 1 if firm i exported a positive amount in year t, but not in year t-1, and 0 otherwise. Sizeit: 
logarithm of the firm’s total real assets. Collateralit/Debtit: the ratio between the firm’s tangible assets and its total 
(long- and short-term) debt. TFPit: total factor productivity. Groupi dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is part 
of a group, and 0 otherwise. Quiscoreit is a measure of how risky the firm is. The lower its Quiscore, the more 
risky a firm is likely to be. Totalvolit: standard deviation of the firm’s total real sales growth. The standard 
deviation is measured over a rolling window of 5 years. Nationalvolit:  standard deviation of the firm’s real 




Table 2: Links between volatility and the probability of bankruptcy 
 









    
Ageit 0.005  0.064 
 (1.65)  (0.46) 
Sizeit -0.183  -4.623 
 (2.51)*  (7.28)** 
Collateralit/Debtit 0.001  2.030 
 (0.02)  (19.71)** 
TFPit -0.128  3.189 
 (3.25)**  (16.30)** 
Groupi -1.236   
 (8.18)**   
Totalvolit 0.762  -4.012 
 (2.53)*  (3.21)** 









Notes: t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The estimates in column (1) were obtained using a random-effects 
Probit specification; those in column (2), using a fixed-effects specification. Time dummies were included in all 
specifications. Time dummies and industry dummies were included in the specification reported in column (1). * 





Table 3: Links between volatility and total factor productivity 
 









    
Totalvolit*LOWVOLit 0.028  -0.265 
 (0.13)  (0.78) 
Totalvolit*HIGHVOLit/MEDIUMVOLit  0.222 -0.059 
 (3.02)**  (0.33) 
Totalvolit*HIGHVOLit  0.170 










Notes: t-statistics are reported in parentheses. All estimates were obtained using a fixed-effects specification. In 
column (2), LOWVOLit/ HIGHVOLit are dummy variables equal to one if firm i’s Totalvol in year t is in the lowest 
(highest) 50 percent of the distribution of the Totalvols of all firms operating in the same industry as firm i’s in 
year t, and 0 otherwise. In column (3), LOWVOLit is equal to one if firm i’s total real sales growth volatility in 
year t is in the lowest 33 percent of the distribution of the volatilities of all firms operating in the same industry as 
firm i’s in year t, and 0 otherwise; MIDDLEVOLit is equal to one if firm i’s volatility in year t is in the middle 33 
percent of the distribution, and 0 otherwise; and HIGHVOLit is equal to one if firm i’s volatility in year t is in the 
highest 33 percent of the distribution, and 0 otherwise. Time dummies were included in all specifications. * 




















      
Ageit  -0.001 -0.001  -0.001 
 (0.54)  (0.38)  (0.34) 
Sizeit 0.341  0.272  0.275 
 (5.67)**  (5.00)**  (5.06)** 
TFPit -0.072  -0.043  -0.045 
 (2.42)*  (1.67)  (1.73) 
Groupi -0.037  0.047  0.052 
 (0.29)  (0.40)  (0.44) 
Nationalvolit  0.725    
 (4.14)**     
Prenationalvolit   0.724   
   (3.60)**   
Prenationalvol1it     0.730 












Notes:  t-statistics are reported in parentheses. All estimates were obtained using a random-effects Probit 
specification. Prenationalvolit: standard deviation of the firm’s real sales calculated over the five years preceding 
and including year t.  Prenationalvol1it:standard deviation of the firm’s real sales calculated over all years 
preceding and including year t. Time dummies and industry dummies were included in all specifications. * 
denotes significance at 5%; ** denotes significance at 1%. Also see Notes to Table 1. 